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JOHN MARSHALL AND WE THE PEOPLE*
MARTIN FLAHERTY**
I. INTRODUCTION
My remarks focus on a portion of McCulloch v. Maryland, that
is not logically necessary to any part of the decision, but which
nonetheless addresses perhaps the most basic question of
constitutional law.
In discussing this question, the counsel for the state of
Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction
of the constitution, to consider that instrument, not as emanating
from the people, but as the act of sovereign and independent
states .2
For his part, Marshall appears to have no doubt about the
answer:
It would be difficult to sustain this proposition.
From these conventions [held in the states], the constitution
derives its whole authority. The government proceeds directly
from the people; it "ordained and established," in the name of the
people; and is declared to be ordained, "in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, and
secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their
posterity." The assent of the states, in their sovereign capacity,
is implied, in calling a convention, and thus submitting that
instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty
to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required not the
affirmance, and could not be negative, by the state governments.
* I would like to give thanks to Mike, Dave, Melody, and the Organizers. Just a few
caveats: Work not just in progress, but just underway; fear less enlightening to you than
useful to me.
** Professor of Law, Co-Director, Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human
Rights, Fordham Law School.
1 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
2 Ad. at 402.
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The constitution, when it was adopted, was of complete
obligation, and bound the state sovereignties. 3
Since I went to graduate school before law school, I came upon
this case after discovering the writings of Gordon Wood, Edmund
Morgan, and Jack Rakove. But when I did I thought it was a
brilliantly concise summary of their work on the nationalist
origins of American popular sovereignty. Recently, and especially
at the Supreme Court, this understanding of popular sovereignty
has come under challenge. Indeed, associating John Marshall
himself with that account has also come under challenge. What I
want to do today is consider the problem that McCulloch raised
concerning just who were the popular sovereign that ordained
the constitution.
First, I want to talk about why this issue is suddenly almost as
important as it was when McCulloch was decided. Then I want
to consider the answer Marshall gave. Finally, I would like to at
least sketch out whether Marshall himself was representative of
the Founding.
II. THE STAKES, Now AS THEN
While the practical effect of it all may be an open question,
arguably never has the Court struck down so many acts of
Congress in so short a time in the name of "states' rights."4 This
"counterrevolution" arguably began with the little noted Gregory
v. Ashcroft,5 then accelerated through United States v. Lopez,6
New York v. United States,7 Pr"ntz v. United States,8 Alden v.
3 Id. at 403-04.
4 This deliberately provocative claim in large part depends on how the relevant terms
are applied. If invalidation based on "states' rights" broadly means any decision that
considers the allocation of power among the federal and state governments, then clearly
the New Deal and even the Progressive Era present rival claims.
For now, I note only that I employ the terms "states' rights" more for its popular currency
than for its theoretical accuracy. Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal
Power v. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089 (1999). Charles
Black correctly pointed out that "rights" are more appropriately attributed to individuals
rather than governmental units. See CHARLES BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM:
HUMAN RIGHTS NAMED AND UNNAMED 41-85 (1997); see also John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immumity. A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1889, 1911 (1983) (focusing on state sovereign immunity from federal jurisdiction).
5 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
6 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
8 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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Maine,9 and last year's United States v. Morrison.1o These cases
have in turn fueled much academic commentary.11 The states'
victories appear so complete that many in court and academia
herald a "restoration" of American federalism.12
As different as these cases may be in specifics, one larger
proposition tends to unite them. Over and over the Court and its
defenders have thought it critical to argue that the nation13 "and
certainly the Constitution" was created by "We the States." Once
popular as the "compact theory"14 of our government, this
particular story remains alive and well at the Supreme Court. In
a current, typical version, "[t]he States entered the Federal union
with their sovereignty intact;"15 indeed, "they adopted the
Constitution."16
Conversely, those Justices on the nationalist side advance the
contrary thesis that the original popular sovereign was not the
States but "We the People" of the United States. Here, one
idiosyncratic example is Justice Kennedy, who has on occasion
rejected both the state-oriented story and the results that
follow. 17 No sooner does he do that, however, then he hops back
9 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
10 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Against these cases stand a small number of exceptions, most
notably U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); see also Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985).
11 See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311,
1327 (1997) (analyzing Garcia); see also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1494 (1994); Martha A. Field, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term:
Comment: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. The Demise of a
Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84, 89 (1985).
12 See Yoo, supra note 11, 1403-04; see also Martin S. Flaherty, Symposium Papers:
Federalism in the 21s' Century Historical Perspective: More Apparent Than Real: The
Revolutionary Commitment to Constitutional Federalism, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 993, 993
(1997); Richard E. Levy & Stephen R. McAllister, Symposium Papers: Federalism in the
21-t Century: Defining the Roles of the National and State Governments in the American
Federal System: A Symposium, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 971 (1997) (pointing out
reemergence of federalism debate in Congress).
13 The questions of which came first, the nation or the states, is a longstanding
debate. See RICHARD MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION 55 (Harper & Row 1987).
14 The term refers to the idea that the federal government results from an original
compact among the states. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 161-202 (Alfred A. Knoph ed. ) (1996); see
also Michael J. Klarman, How Great were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions, 87 VA.
L. REV., 1111, 1129 (2001) (discussing how Marshall rejected state compact theory and its
implications).
15 Blatchford v. Native Vill. Of Noatak and Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)
(emphasis added).
16 Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
17 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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on the "We the States" bandwagon in both senses. 18
In between these theoretic possibilities is the proposition that
the peoples of the several states as opposed to their governments
created the United States. Writing for four justices usually in
the majority, Justice Thomas argued just this in U.S. Term
Limits v. Thornton.19 Yet either way, as his opinion makes clear,
"the notion of popular sovereignty that under girds the
Constitution does not erase state boundaries, but tracks them."20
In one sense, which of the three theories should not matter.
Yet in another sense we all tend to act as if the choice is vital. As
Larry Kramer has pointed out,21 determining the nature of the
popular sovereign that created this new constitutional order is
not the same thing as determining the nature of the order itself.
"We the People" of the United States could easily have decided
that national power should be minute, state sovereign immunity
broad, and an authority to "commandeer" state executive officials
non-existent. "We the States" could just have easily have
ordained a government that came out differently on any or all of
these issues.
Almost no one, however, views these perfectly logical
possibilities as likely. At least as far back as McCulloch v.
Maryland, litigants and judges alike "have deemed it of some
importance, in the construction of the constitution, to consider
that instrument as emanating not from the people, but as an act
of sovereign and independent states."22 They have done so even
when, as in McCulloch, the choice between these competing
stories does not directly resolve any issue under consideration.2 3
This ongoing attraction to a logically irrelevant debate must in
large part rest on the sensible intuition that groups, nor more
than individuals, like to grant power to rivals. This insight
prevailed over strict logic during ratification, as state-oriented
Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry scoffed at the idea of a
national popular sovereign, while Federalists such as James
18 Alden, 527 U.S. at 718-20.
19 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
20 Id., at 849.
21 As per conversation author had with Larry Kramer.
22 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404-05.
23 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into The Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 233 (2000).
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Wilson embraced it.24 As the Supreme Court's recent opinions
show, it still prevails. 25
So much does this thought prevail, in fact, that the usual
understandings of Marshall on this issue have been contested in
much the same way as the issue itself. So to Marshall I turn.
III. MARSHALL
The usual scholarly understanding of Marshall on this point
paralleled my own initial encounter as a graduate student. To
cite one example, Professor Hobson has written that
"Marshall premised constitutional nationalism on a theory of
the Constitution as a constituent act of the people of the United
States, not a compact among the several states."26 Members of
the
Court at times have echoed this understanding. In Term
Limits, for example, Justice Kennedy stated:
It might be objected that because the States ratified the
Constitution, the people can delegate power only through the
States or by acting in their capacities as citizens of particular
States. But in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court set forth its
authoritative rejection of this idea:
The Convention which framed the constitution was indeed
elected by the State legislatures. But the instrument ... was
submitted to the people.... It is true, they assembled in their
several States-and where else should they have assembled? No
political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down
the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the
American people into one common mass. Of consequence, when
they act, they act in their States. But the measures they adopt
do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people
24 See infra test accompanying n. 53-55.
25 See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 149 (resurrecting Tenth Amendment by
invalidating Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment as unconstitutional
infringement of state sovereignty); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364
(2001) (holding that state sovereignty prohibited application of section of Americans With
Disabilities Act to allow suits against states by private citizens); U.S. v. Morrison, 521
U.S. 548, 648-51 (discussing historical debate and case law debate over state immunity).
26 See Charles Hobson, Editing Marshall, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 823, 850-53 (2000)
(discussing Marshall's judicial philosophy and his legal correspondence with other
justices); Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court 1815-1835, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1, 44 (1996) (noting theme of Marshall's tenure was nationalism and state
sovereignty).
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themselves, or become the measures of the State governments. 27
In the same case, however, Justice Thomas tried to turn use of
Marshall on its head by arguing, first, that Marshall actually
advocated a "We the Peoples" model, and second, that this
intermediate model ultimately cut in favor of state's rights.
At the same time, however, the people of each State retained
their separate political identities. As Chief Justice Marshall put
it, "no political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of
breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of
compounding the American people into one common mass."28
The concurring opinion appears to draw precisely the opposite
conclusion from the passage in McCuiloch that contains this
sentence. But while the concurring opinion seizes on Marshall's
references to "the people," Marshall was merely using that
phrase in contradistinction to "the State governments."29
Marshall's opinion accepted this premise, even borrowing some
of counsel's language.30 What Marshall rejected was counsel's
conclusion that the Constitution therefore was merely "a compact
between the States."31 As Marshall explained, the acts of "the
people themselves" in the various ratifying conventions should
not be confused with "the measures of the State governments." 32
It would, however, be difficult to sustain Justice Thomas's
proposition. Granted, the passage was ambiguous, nor was
Thomas's view untenable, but a close reading indicates that
Marshall was talking about logistics and not theory.
But, of course, the larger context would appear to resolve the
question. Looking before, consider Marshall's own account of his
early nationalism in his autobiographical sketch:
I had grown up at a time when a love of union and resistance
to the claims of Great Britain were the inseparable inmates of
the same bosom; "when patriotism and a strong fellow feeling
27 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 840-41 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland); see also Printz v.
U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (reiterating conclusion that federal government has power
to regulate individuals and not states).
28 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 849 (discussing Marshall's reasoning in McCulloch and
disagreeing with it); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 363 (argument of counsel).
29 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 849 n. 2.
30 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 363 (argument of counsel).
31 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403; see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth
Amendments Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 66 (1995) (noting Marshall
jurisprudence rejected notion that Constitution was compact with states).
32 See McCulloch, 17 US. at403-04.
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with our suffering fellow citizens of Boston were identical;" when
the maxim "united we stand, divided we fall" was the maxim of
every orthodox American; and I had imbibed these sentiments so
thoroughly that they constituted [interesting word choice there] a
part of my being. 33
For him, the American people predated the Constitution.
Unlike Lance Banning's Madison, 34 America came first. But as
Professor Hobson pointed out, there appears to be evidence that
resolves the matter, and it is in the pamphlets Marshall
unusually wrote to defend McCulloch in particular.
There is, then, no agreement formed between the government
of the United States and those of the states. Our constitution is
not a compact. It is the act of a single party. It is the act of the
people of the United States, assembling in their respective states,
and adopting a government for the whole nation. Their motives
for this act are assigned by themselves. The have specified the
objects they intended to accomplish, and have enumerated the
powers with which those objects were to be accomplished. 35
Marshall it seems, meant "We the People" of the nation.36
IV. FOUNDING
A more important, and tougher, question is how representative
was Marshall during the ratification process of which he speaks?
33 JOHN MARSHALL, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 9 (Adams ed.) (1937).
34 See Lance Banning, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC (1995) (arguing that Madison was less consistently
nationalist than usually thought).
35 See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, 203 (Gerald
Gunther ed. 1969) (quoting Marshall's eighth essay, "A Friend of the Constitution,"
displaying Marshall's argument that his decision was correct and that federal government
is compact between federal government and people); Charles F. Hobson, The Bill of Rights
at 200 Years: Bicentennial Perspective James Madison, The Bill of Rights and the
Problem of The States, 31 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 267, 273 (1990) (discussing Marshall's
view of framers' intent and its relationship to his judicial philosophy). See generally R.
Kent Newmyer, John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States Rights
Tradition, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 875, 883-86 (2000) (discussing critique of Marshall's
theory and Marshall's response to that critique).
36 Or so I thought. Subsequent research, however, has reluctantly but firmly led me to
the conclusion that Marshall indeed understood his treatment of the Founding in
McCulloch as navigating a middle course between We the States and We the People,
effectively adopting the We the Peoples approach as Justice Thomas surmised. I
nonetheless further conclude that, in stark contrast to Justice Thomas, Marshall saw this
starting point as leading to nationalist results rather than to state-oriented doctrine. See
Martin S. Flaherty, John Marshall, McCuiloch v. Maryland, and "We the People"
Revisions in Need of Revising, - WM. & MARY L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2002).
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The persistence of the We The People/We The States debate
suggests that further inquiry may not yield an answer. That
would not be the worst result. In that case, the Supreme Court,
among others ideally would then refrain from offering a
particular account as the clear winner and move beyond history
to consider political science, comparative law, structure, or
evolving tradition to reach sound doctrinal conclusions. Then
again, the dispute over the popular sovereign's first incarnation
might also have endured because even after 200 years we have
not been conducting the historical inquiry the right way.
This possibility might seem a non-starter given the work of
modern historians. Those scholars, who over the last generation
have reconstructed original constitutional understandings,
almost all side with the nationalist story. Edmund S. Morgan,
for example, writes "Madison was inventing a sovereign
American people to overcome the sovereign states,"37 continuing
"[tihe Anti-federalists were not prepared to challenge Madison's
crucial invention: they did not deny that there could be an
American people as opposed to the peoples of the several
states."38 Likewise, Jack Rakove, notes with apparent approval
that James Wilson believed that "the right of a sovereign people
to replace a defective compact with a more perfect union."39 In
similar fashion, Gordon Wood has written, "[Tihe more the
Federalists stress the foundation of the new Constitution in the
people, the more excited they became with the spectacular
significance of the constitution-making process."40 All this said,
much in this line of scholarship tends to adopt the nationalist
position, and even then not always clearly, without squarely
considering alternatives other than ratification of the states by
sovereign state governments.
For better or worse, the same cannot be said of scholarship
from the law side of the aisle. Precisely because of its doctrinal
implications, legal scholars have more directly considered
whether the popular sovereign was understood as the people of
37 EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 267 (1988).
38 Id., at 282.
39 See RAKOVE, supra note 14, at 163 (1996).
40 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 535
(1969).
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the nation, the state governments, or some possibility in
between. Much of this work on either side of the question has
been hack advocacy.4 1 But some has not. One study worth
mention in this regard is Henry Monaghan's We The Peoples,
Orignal Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment.42 In a
nuanced account, Monaghan considers the structural and
historical evidence indicating that both the government and the
popular sovereign that ordained it cannot be easily dismissed as
either, in Madison's phrase, "wholly national or wholly federal."43
Monaghan's conclusion not only better accords with history's
usual complexity than the conclusions of the historians, it
suggests that legally-motivated historical inquiry can advance
historical inquiry in general.
Exactly for that reason, however, Monaghan should not
necessarily be considered the final word. Instead, a further look
from a slightly different angle suggests an alternative "though at
this stage, merely working" hypothesis. A sketch of the thesis
begins with Preamble, the text that ostensibly settles the matter,
which famously proclaims, "We the People of the United
States... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America."44 Nationalists typically pounce on
these words with the plain meaning argument that people of the
nation meant people of the nation.45 To this opponents advance a
number of points to show that the plain meaning is not so plain
after all.46 One counter argument notes that the original
preamble read, "We the People of the States of New Hampshire,
41 Citations deliberately omitted.
42 Henry Monaghan, We The People[s], Onginal Understanding, and Constitutional
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 124 (1996)
43 Id., at 126 (quoting James Madison, FEDERALIST NO. 39).
44 U.S. CONST., Pmbl; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
177, 590 (Max Farrand ed., 1987) (comparing August draft stating "We the people of the
States..." with Report of Committee of Style, "We the People of the United States...").
45 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 324-25 (1816) (stating "[tihe
Constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their
sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the Constitution declares, by
"the people of the United States."); see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 365-67 (1851) (declaring Union formed upon
decision of entire populace rather than individual state citizenry); cf Alexander
Hanebeck, Democracy Within Federalism: An Attempt to Reestabhlish Middle Ground, 37
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 360 (2000) (noting "difference between preamble of Articles of
Confederation and Constitution is striking").
46 See Raoul Berger, FederaHsm: The Founders' Design - A Response to lichael
McConnell, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 56 (1988) (emphasizing ratification process'
structural basis being individual states).
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Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations...",
but was changed by the Committee of Style on the ground that
since ratifications by nine state conventions were all that was
required to establish the new government, it was impossible to
tell which would be the first nine or whether all thirteen would
approve.47 One further rejoinder points out that the text of the
Constitution refers to the term "United States" as plural.48
These lawyerly counters, however, run into counters of their
own. "United States," to be sure, was seldom referred to in the
singular during the eighteenth century. Yet British usage, then
and now, commonly employed the plural for collective entities
that were nonetheless understood to be a single unit. Today,
think the ways in which Ireland are going to defeat England in
the World Cup, (even though the United States do not have a
chance against Brazil in the same competition). Then, consider
that how the Constitution also refers to the House and Senate
"unitary institutional bodies rather than some sort of
confederation or alliance" in the plural. 49 Likewise true, as far as
it goes, is the original purpose for the Preamble's switch to people
"of the United States." The somewhat less lawyerly, and far less
trivial, rejoinder to this objection is that on almost any theoretic
account, the understanding of the few dozen individuals at the
Federal Convention should bow before the more general
understanding of the public that had the authority to vote the
Constitution up or down.50  This point seems especially
compelling when the issue is the public's self-understanding of
who and what they are. Reconstructing this self-understanding
(or, as Jack Rakove would caution, possible understandings5l) is
no small task.
The early projections nonetheless indicate that research
confirms what both the untutored perspective and scholarly
account suspects: "We the People of the United States," which
appears to speak of a national populace, was generally
47 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 44, at 177.
48 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 846, n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating Constitution
'consistently" uses plural form).
49 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 5 & §3, cl. 2.
50 See Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 5 CONST.
COMMENT. 77, 83-84 (1988).
51 See RAKOVE, supra note 14, at 3-22.
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understood in just this way.5 2 Beyond simply confirming what
previous historians have largely projected, a fresh look at the
matter also suggests an important reason why: once divorced
from its original purpose and placed in public discourse, the
rhetorical power of the Preamble took on a life of its own,
polarized thinking about the possibilities of popular sovereignty,
and became its own nationalist, self-fulfilling prophecy.
For now, consider some of the more famous exchanges on the
issue. Perhaps chief among these came from Anti-federalist
Patrick Henry, which came late in the ratification process but at
the outset of the Virginia Convention. The better to defeat the
Constitution, Henry dramatically identified the nationalist
stakes, arguing that the Preamble spoke directly to the identity
of the popular sovereign aspiring to establish the new
government and implying a stark choice between a national
populace and sovereign states:
[Blut, Sir, give me leave to demand, what right had they to say,
We, the People. My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious
solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, who authorized
them to speak the language of, We, the People, instead of We, the
States? States are the characteristics, and the soul of a
confederation. If the States be not the agents of this compact, it
must be one great consolidated National Government of the
people of all the States.5 3
Federalists did not always pick up this gauntlet, yet neither
did they take the easy way out. Faced with challenges such as
Henry's, the Constitution's supporters could have responded
precisely that the Preamble's grandiose opening was merely a
device to get around the problem of late ratifications. This does
not appear to have happened. Instead, some Federalists
famously stated that the Preamble conveyed exactly the meaning
that Henry feared. Most notable here was James Wilsons
remarks at the earlier Pennsylvania Convention:
His [William Findlay's] position is:
that the supreme power resides in the States, as governments;
and mine is, that it resides in the People, as the fountain of
52 Id. at 18.
53 See 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 930 (Patrick Henry, Jun. 4, 1788) (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino, eds., 1990) (emphasis in the original) [hereinafter, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
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government; that the people have not - and that the people mean
not - and that the people ought not, to part with it to any
government whatsoever... I consider the people of the United
States as forming one great community, and I consider the people
of the different States as forming communities again on a lesser
scale. From this great division it will be found necessary that
different proportions of legislative powers should be given to the
governments, according to the nature, number, and magnitude of
their objects... I view the States as made for the People as well
as by them, and not the People as made for the States. The
People, therefore, have a right, whilst enjoying the undeniable
powers of society, to form either a general government, or state
governments, in what manner they please; or to accommodate
them to one another, and by this means preserve them all.54
Wilson, Findlay, and Henry all agreed about the either/or
choice for the popular sovereign. The leader of Pennsylvania's
Federalists simply declared the opposite choice.
More often, though, Federalists simply did not respond. Back
in Virginia, for example, no one countered Henry in any way
remotely like Wilson's reply to Findlay. Though negative
inferences are always dangerous, even this reaction is telling. As
Jack Rakove cogently noted, a common structural feature of the
ratification debates witnessed Anti-federalists overstating the
Constitution's departures from the status quo, in an effort to
make the proposal seem dangerously radical, and Federalists
poor mouthing the document's innovations to make it appear
more cautious.5 5 In this way, anyone in search of statements
equating the Constitution with consolidated, national
government had best consult its state-oriented opponents. The
framework's nationalist champions, conversely, remain the best
source for quotations predicting the states' ongoing vitality in the
future regime. Just this phenomenon gives the work of certain
younger originalists a certain prima facie plausibility insofar as
they argue that Federalists leaders had to ratchet down the goals
they initially had upon leaving the Federal Convention to get the
document approved by a less adventurous public.5 6 But this is
54 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, at 472-73 (James Wilson, Dec. 4, 1787) (emphasis in the
original).
55 RAKOVE, supra note 14, at 94-130.
56 Compare John C. Yoo, Global'sm and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-
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what did not appear to happen with regard to the popular
sovereign. Explanations for the moment must remain
speculative. The foregoing exchanges, however, suggest that the
Federalists had little room to retreat with regard to the nature of
popular sovereignty in part because the Preamble gave them
little room for retreat, especially given the binary choice-state
governments vs. national people-that various Founders believed
they faced.
Then again, there is Madison. No one, including Wilson, so
thoroughly explored or advanced the Constitution's conceptual
breakthroughs. Madison's analysis was especially nuanced in
examining the ways the framework's unique unprecedented
approach to federalism overcame such traditional objections as
the contradiction of imperium in imperio.57 In Federalist No. 39,
Madison summarized his multi-layered views:
The proposed Constitution, therefore, even when tested by the
rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a
national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In
its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from
which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is
partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these
powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again it
is federal, not national; and, finally in the authoritative mode of
introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly
national.5 8
Easy to miss in this tightly packed passage is the first specific
assertion that the Constitution rests on a federal foundation.
Earlier in the essay, Madison had sought to make clear that the
authority to create the new government depends, "on the assent
of the people of America... [but] ... not as individuals
composing one entire nation."59 Rather, "[iut is to be the assent of
the and ratification of the several States, derived from the
Execution, and the Orginal Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. (1999) (arguing that
against an internationalist understanding of the Treaty Power as in England), with
Martin Flaherty, Histozy Right? Historical Scholarslip, Orzginal Understanding, and
Treaties as the gSupreme Law of the Land, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999) (arguing
treaties are self-executing and domestically binding upon passage).
57 See FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO,
at viii (2000) (stating proposition "translates roughly as supreme power within supreme
power... within a single jurisdiction").
58 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1982).
59 Id. at 243.
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supreme authority in each State the authority of the People
themselves."60 In other words, America's popular sovereign was
neither "We the People of the United States," understood as the
national people, nor "We the States," but "We the Peoples of the
United States." As Monaghan points out, this middle position
not only has the historical weight of Madison behind it, it
appears to comport with the document's own "partly national,
partly federal" stance in general. 61
The only problem with the Madisonian solution is that no one
appeared to listen. As the other passages suggest, people within
"the people" more commonly divided into two opposing camps,
assigning constitution-making authority to either the national
public or the sovereign state governments. If so, it wouldn't be
the only time the Constitution's most subtle expositor proved too
subtle for his contemporaries. Larry Kramer has convincingly
argued that almost no one during the ratification debates noted,
remarked upon, opposed or extolled Madison's theory of faction in
Federalist No. 10, what today is perhaps is his most celebrated
hypothesis.62 In this light, it should appear less shocking to
conclude that the subtleties of No. 39 likewise evaded Madison's
peers. The theory of factions, moreover, logically had an easier
time of it. Both ideas ran into older understandings.
Montesquieu clouded any quick appreciation for the notion that
the larger the republic, the more moderate the effects of faction.
Eighteenth-century conventions about sovereignty, similarly,
could not help but overshadow the conceit that at least nine
sovereign peoples could be the sovereign creator of that republic.
Only the latter idea, however, had the further, textual, problem
of having to counter the first seven words of the proposal to
create a new constitutional order.
CONCLUSION
Much labor remains before this thesis moves beyond the
borders of history "lite." Some work that even a working thesis
can do, however, is suggest consequences. Historiographically,
the Founding generation's approach to "We the People" suggests
60 Id.
61 See Monaghan, supra, note 42.
62 See Larry Kramer, Madson'sAudbence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 656 (1999).
[Vol. 16:335
2002] JOHNMARSHLL AND WE THE PEOPLE 349
that mainstream historians have been right for the wrong, or at
least incomplete, reasons. Doctrinally, the experience indicates
that the Supreme Court has built its neo-states' rights
jurisprudence on a foundation of sand, doubly so since the
"original intent" generally provides the main building materials
for that jurisprudence. Of more immediate relevance, the story
further suggests both the power of a rhetorical trope such as "We
the People" in creating a reality that in turn can create a regime.
Then again, the slow dripping of the Supreme Court's state-
oriented rhetoric "together with similar tropes outside that the
Court merely echoes" also indicates how such a creation can also
erode without care.

